ÍNDICE

CHAPTER 1 - SECURITISATION: ECONOMIC FUNCTION, ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

- 1.1. What securitisation is
- 1.2. The advantages of securitisation
 - 1.2(a). Increasing the amount of bank funding available
 - 1.2(b). The diversification of credit risk
- 1.3. Problems with securitisation
 - 1.3(a). Information asymmetry and the need for due diligence
 - 1.3(b). Misaligned incentives
- 1.4. Financialisation and Shadow Banking
 - 1.4(a). Financialisation
 - 1.4(b). Financialisation and Neo-Liberalism
 - 1.4(c). Financialisation and the rise of household debt in the U.S
- 1.5. Shadow Banks
 - 1.5(a). The use of securitisation by banks
 - 1.5(b). Asset-Backed Commercial Paper
 - 1.5(c). Security Lending
 - 1.5(d). Repurchase Agreements
- 1.6. Summary

CHAPTER 2 - FROM TAX FARMING TO THE PRIVATE LABEL MBS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF SECURITISATION BEFORE THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS

- 2.0. Tax farming
- 2.1. The "compera"
- 2.2. British sovereign debt in the 18th century
- 2.3. Dutch Plantation Loans in the 18th Century
- 2.4. The Prussian Pfandbriefe
- 2.5. The Consolidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana
- 2.6. U.S Farm mortgage debentures in the 1880s
- 2.7. U.S Real Estate Bonds, guaranteed mortgages and participation certificates
 - 2.7(a). Real Estate Bonds
 - 2.7(b). Participation certificates and guaranteed mortgages
- 2.8. The Federal Land Banks

- 2.9. Government Intervention in the U.S mortgage market
- 2.10. The Birth of Government Sponsored Enterprises in the U.S
- 2.11. The use of securitisation by the U.S GSEs
 - 2.11(a). Pass-through structures
 - 2.11(b). Bond-like structures
- 2.12. The creation of Freddy Mac
- 2.13. The growth of MBS guaranteed by the GSEs
- 2.14. The development of the private MBS market
- 2.15. The creation of the REMIC

CHAPTER 3 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF DERIVATIVE REGULATION IN THE USA

- 3.0. The basic types of modern derivative contract
- 3.1. A brief history of derivative contracts
- 3.2. The growth of derivatives in England
- 3.3. The rise of derivatives on stocks in England and the first English legislation on derivative trading
- 3.4. The South Sea Company
- 3.5. The Bubble Act
- 3.6. The bursting of the South Sea Bubble and the stock-jobbing Act
- 3.7. The influence of Barnard's Act in the U.K
 - 3.7(a). The internal organisation of the London Stock Exchange
 - 3.7(b). The steady clarification and delimitation of the terms of the Act by case law
 - 3.7(c). The repeal of Barnard's Act in 1860
- 3.8. The effect of gaming laws on derivative contracts
- 3.9. The influence of UK statutes and case-law on the statutes and case-law of the $\mbox{U.S}$
 - 3.9(a). Statutes
 - 3.9(b). Case-Law
- 3.10. Problems with the intent to deliver rule
 - 3.10(a). The problem of interpretation
 - 3.10(b). The conflict with Common Law principles
- 3.11. Exchanges and Bucket Shops
- 3.12. The Christie case and the serious purpose test
- 3.13. The Future Trading Act

- 3.14. The Grains Futures Act
- 3.15. The Commodity Exchange Act

CHAPTER 4 - THE ROLE OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITISATION, DERIVATIVES, SHORT TERM FUNDING AND RISK MODELS IN THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS

Part 1: The role of credit default swaps and collateralised debt obligations

- 4.1. The development of new types of derivatives and the steady erosion of the U.S regulatory framework
 - 4.1(a). The extension of the term commodity
 - (i). The conflict of jurisdiction with the SEC
 - 4.1(b). The creation of swaps
 - 4.1(c). The legal nature of commodity futures
 - 4.1(d). The legal nature of swaps and hybrid instruments
 - 4.1(e). The terms of the CFTC's swap exemption
 - 4.1(f). Cementing the exemptions in federal law
 - 4.1(g). Warnings of the dangers of deregulation
 - 4.1(h). The movement to exclude all OTC derivatives from CFTC regulation
 - 4.1(i). The Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000
 - 4.1(j). The provisions of the CFMA 2000 and its link to the GFC
- 4.2. Credit Default Swaps were not considered to be insurance contracts
- 4.3. Collateralised Debt Obligations and Credit Default Swaps
 - 4.3(a). Credit derivatives applied to securitisation structures
 - 4.3(b). Super senior tranches
 - 4.3(c). Performing due diligence on CDOs
 - 4.3(d). The risk weights of Super–Senior tranches
 - 4.3(e). "Insuring" CDOs
 - 4.3(f). Monoline Insurance Companies

Part 2: From the housing boom to subprime

- 4.4. The securitization of Subprime mortgages
 - 4.4(a). Subprime
 - 4.4(b). The change in housing prices, and the increase of mortgage originations and refinancing
 - 4.4(c). The rapid decline of the housing market
 - 4.4(d). Legal developments and alternative mortgages
 - 4.4(e). The decline in U.S underwriting standards

- 4.4(f). Government sponsored enterprises
- 4.4(g). Private Label Securitisations
- 4.4(h). The gradual erosion of Glass–Steagall and the Vertical Integration of the Securitisation Chain

Part 3: Financing securitisation through short-term funding

- 4.5. Asset Backed Commercial Paper
 - 4.5(a). The opacity of SIVs
 - 4.5(b). Repurchase agreements

Part 4: Modelling errors and securitisation

- 4.6. Modelling CDOs
 - 4.6(a). VaR

CHAPTER 5 - THE EUROPEAN SECURITISATION FRAMEWORK

- Part 1: European securitisation and the European response to the crisis
 - 5.1. The performance of European and U.S Securitisation
 - 5.2. Responses to the crisis the E.U risk retention rule
 - 5.2(a). Initiatives to improve the quality of securitisation
 - 5.2(b). The Basel STC framework
 - 5.2(c). STC criteria relating to asset risk
 - 5.2(d). STC criteria relating to structural risk
 - 5.2(e). STC criteria relating to fiduciary and servicer risk
 - 5.2(f). The EMIR, Securitisation and OTC derivatives
 - 5.3. The European Securitisation Regulation
 - 5.3(a). The stated objectives of the Regulation
 - 5.3(b). Securitisation
 - 5.3(c). Originator
 - 5.3(d). Sponsors
 - 5.3(e). The Special Purpose Entity
 - 5.3(f). A tranche
 - 5.3(g). Traditional and synthetic securitisations
 - 5.3(h). Investors
 - 5.3(i). A servicer
 - 5.3(j). Key provisions that are applicable to all securitisations
 - (i). Due diligence requirements Article 5
 - (ii). Transparency requirements Article 7

- 5.3(k). The risk retention requirement Article 6
- 5.3(I). Transparency requirements Article 7
- 5.3(m). The ban on resecuritizations Article 8
- 5.3(n). Loan granting criteria Article 9

5.4. STS Securitisation

- 5.4(a). The use of the STS designation Article 18
- 5.4(b). The simplicity requirements Article 20
 - (i). True sale
 - (ii). No clawback provisions
 - (iii). Unencumbered assets
 - (iv). Clear eligibility criteria
 - (v). Homogenous assets
 - (vi). The specific homogeneity factors for residential mortgages
 - (vii). Defined periodic payment streams
 - (viii). Exposures originated in the ordinary course of business
 - (ix). No exposures in default
 - (x). At least one payment made
- 5.4(c). Standardisation requirements Article 21
 - (i). Mandatory hedging of currency and interest rate risks
 - (ii). Referenced interest payments
 - (iii). Enforcement notices
 - (iv). Sequential payments and the prohibition of market value triggers
 - (v). Triggers for priority payments in non-sequential securitisations
 - (vi). Early amortisation triggers in revolving securitisations
 - (vii). Clearly defined contractual duties
- 5.4(d). The transparency criteria
 - (i). A liability cash-flow model
 - (ii). Energy performance
- 5.5. Simple, transparent and standardised on-balance sheet synthetic securitisations
 - 5.5(a). The Prime Collateralised Securities Risk Transfer Criteria
 - 5.5(b). Common eligibility criteria for PCS synthetic securitisations
 - (i). Balance street criteria
 - (ii). Alignment of interests
 - (iii). No resecuritisations

- (iv). No embedded maturity transformation
- (v). Transparency Standards
- (vi). Risk transfer securitisation quality standards
- (vii). Risk transfer standards
- (viii). General underlying asset standards
- (ix). Warranty standards
- 5.5(c). The decision to promote an STC framework for on-balance sheet synthetic securitisations
- 5.5(d). The assets used in synthetic securitisations
- 5.5(e). The focus of regulation in synthetic securitisations
- 5.5(f). The STS synthetic regime in EU Regulation 2017/2402
- 5.5(g). Key Synthetic Securitisation Definitions in the EU Regulation
- 5.5(h). The STS balance-sheet synthetic securitisation simplicity requirements
- 5.6. The STS synthetic standardisation criteria
 - 5.6(a). Listing the underlying exposures
 - 5.6(b). Transaction documentation
- 5.7. The STS synthetic transparency criteria
 - 5.7(a). Specific Synthetic Securitisation Criteria
 - 5.7(b). Specified credit events
 - 5.7(c). The credit protection payment
 - 5.7(d). The protection premium
 - 5.7(e). Early termination of the credit protection agreement
 - 5.7(f). Synthetic excess spread
 - 5.7(g). The credit protection agreement
 - 5.7(h). Unfunded credit risk protection agreements
 - 5.7(i). Funded credit risk protection agreements
- 5.8. The type of securities eligible for funded synthetic securitisations
- Part 2: Current issues with the European securitisation framework
 - 5.9. The criticisms that have been directed at the European Securitisation framework
 - 5.9(a). (i) The prudential framework for securitisations
 - 5.9(a). (ii) Criticisms of the prudential framework for securitisations
 - (a). Credit institutions
 - (b). Insurance and Reinsurance undertakings
 - 5.9(b). Criticisms of disclosure and transparency requirements